

Spain

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

19 APR 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Helping Spain

(U) On April 8, we received the joint response to Judge Clark on helping Spain that was initialed by Secretary Haig. However, with the passage of time and negotiating events since Judge Clark's request, the proposed response received is outdated.

(U) A revised draft has been prepared, initialed by Secretary Weinberger, and is attached.

John H. Stanford
John H. Stanford
Executive Secretary

SPAIN

Attachment

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JUN 15 2018

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable William P. Clark
The White House

JUN 15 2018

FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Caspar W. Weinberger *Jan* 19 APR 1982

SUBJECT: Helping Spain (U)

(S) On January 23, you asked for our joint recommendations on a range of feasible steps in response to King Juan Carlos' appeal for U.S. support. Since then, we have taken a number of actions to strengthen our bilateral relationships with Spain and support the democratic process in that country. We will continue to seek ways to further this effort. However, our ability to do so is constrained by the dynamics of Spanish politics and our limited resources. We are in the final stages of current negotiations and are trying to be as generous as possible. But, ultimately, the peaceful maturation of democracy in Spain will depend more on Spanish management of internal factors rather than external assistance.

(U) Following are actions we have taken or are underway:

(S) A. NATO. The Spanish Government believes that Spanish membership in NATO will divert the military's attention away from internal concerns, allowing the democratic process to grow. We agree with this concept--to a point, although NATO membership is no guarantee against a military take over, as we learned in Greece in 1967 and Turkey in 1980. Nevertheless, we have been the driving force behind swift Spanish entry into NATO and the momentum we created and are sustaining has created a good chance that Spain will be a NATO participant in the May ministerial and June summit.

(S) B. Security Assistance. Our FY 1982 and 1983 security assistance programs are designed to reflect our recognition of Spanish military needs and willingness to support those needs. In FY 1982, our program was \$144 million (\$125 million FMS credits, \$17 million ESF and \$2 million IMET). In 1983, the program amounts to \$415 million (\$400 million FMS credits, \$12 million ESF and \$3 million IMET). Even though our program for these years does not include concessional credits or grant aid (MAP) we regard it as most generous, fourth only to Israel, Egypt, and Turkey, and an example of our "best effort" pledge which will be reflected in the agreement we are now negotiating.

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(S) C. Extended Grace and Repayment Periods. The Spaniards have asked us to extend the grace and repayment periods for guaranteed loans. State and Treasury are presently examining this possibility.

(S) D. Waiver of R&D Recoupment and Asset Charges. Again, at the request of the Spaniards, we are examining the possibility of waiving R&D recoupment and asset charges on the future Spanish purchase of either the F-16 or F-18 aircraft.

(S) E. Military Equipment. Early in the negotiations, Spain presented a request for \$3.8 billion in military equipment in the form of grants, loans and leases over a five-year period. Unfortunately, our ability to transfer equipment through these means is severely constrained by law and the dearth of surplus equipment in the inventory. One positive response will be the extension of our lease to Spain of four P-3A aircraft on favorable terms and an offer to lease an additional few. Realistically, however, most of Spain's military requirements will have to be satisfied from new production through FMS and we are still in the process of trying to convince the Spaniards of this.

(S) F. Military Exchange Visits and Joint Exchanges. Earlier this year, the entire leadership of the Spanish armed forces was replaced. Exchange visits between the US service chiefs and their counterparts will be arranged. These and increased visits by Spanish officers to European commands will be helpful in making the Spanish military realize that it is an integral part of the Western Alliance. Joint exercises will increase in number and scale as Spain enters NATO.

(S) In conclusion, we believe we are being as supportive of the democratic process in Spain as possible and, on the whole, regard our projected assistance for the Spanish armed forces to be most generous under existing circumstances. Our task now, of course, is to convince the Spaniards of this and bring current negotiations to an amicable conclusion.

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